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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY

This is an appeal by Intervenor from an order and judgment of the
Third Judicial

District Court

for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, dismissing the complaint in intervention.
After the Ccatplaint and Answer had been filed, Intervenor filed a motion
for summary judgment against Defendant.
for summary judgment.

Defendant filed her cross motion

Intervener's motion was denied.

Defendant's motion

was granted.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Mthough Intervenor attempts to raise other issues, the only real
issue for review is whether or not Title 78-12-40, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, applies to the facts of this case and tolls the running of the
statute of limitations.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Title 78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides:
Effect of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either
by law or contract for commencing the same shall have
expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
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jgTATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of Case. The Intervener, as personal representative of
the estate of Etta Wood, claims in his Complaint in Intervention (R. 589593) that plaintiff Milton J. Hiltsley, deceased brother of Etta Wood,
received money from her, that he held those monies as her "trustee" and
that he breach his "confidential relationship" with her when he deposited
those monies in savings accounts and certificates of deposit in the joint
names of Milton J.

Hiltsley and Hallalene M.

Ryder, the defendant.

(Paragraph 4 and 8 of Complaint, R. 590, 592)
The
Defendant

claim which
holds

the

Intervener

monies

asserts

represented

certificates of deposit as a

against

by

the

Defendant

savings

is that

account

and

"trustee" for the Etta Wood's estate.

(Paragraph (3) of prayer for relief in Conplaint, R.593)

B. Course of Proceedings.

After trial of the issues between

Plaintiff and Defendant, the trial court, Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
entered judgment in favor of the estate of Etta Wood, and in favor of
Plaintiff Ruth S. Hiltsley personally. (R. 97-99)

On Defendant's appeal of

that judgment, case No. 19145, this Court rendered its decision reversing
and remanding the case back to the Third District Court "for joinder of
Etta Wood's Estate."

(R 583-585) Etta Wood's personal representative,

Intervenor herein, filed a Corrplaint in Intervention against the estate of
Milton

J.

Hiltsley,

plaintiff,

Defendant filed her Answer.

and

against

(R 594-596)

Defendant.

(R

589-593)

Four days after Defendant's

Answer was filed, Intervenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 601603)

Defendant then filed her Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 614-

2

615)

C. Disposition in Court Below. Intervener's motion for summary
judgment was denied. Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment was
granted, and the Ccatplaint in Intervention was dismissed with prejudice.
(R. 620-621)

D. Statement of Facts. Because this appeal involves the application
of the statute of limitations, the following facts relevant to the issue to
be decided on appeal are presented in chronological order.
1.

Etta Wood, whose estate is represented by her Personal

Representative, Douglas P. Simpson, as Intervener, died on January 10,
1980.

(Decision of S. Ct., R. 583)
2.

Milton J. Hiltsley, whose estate is represented by his

personal representative, Ruth S. Hiltsley, died

on August 26, 1981.

(Decision of S. Ct., R. 583)
3.

Ihe Third District Court, Judge Bryant H. Croft, rendered

its decision after trial between Plaintiff and Defendant, on March 29,
1983.

(R. 97-99)
4.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1983.

5.

Intervener was appointed personal representative of the

(R.100)

estate of Etta Wood on May 25, 1983 in the Third District Court, Probate #
P83-416.

(Motion to Intervene, S. Ct. file 19145)
6.

Intervener, not a party to the lawsuit, filed a Motion to

Intervene in the proceedings on appeal before the Utah Supreme Court on
August 30, 1983, which motion was denied.
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(S. Ct. file 19145)

7.
rendered

On June 10, 1987, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

its decision reversing the Judgment of the lower court and

remanded the case back to the Third District Court for joinder of the
estate of Etta Wood. (R. 583-585)
8.

Intervener was made a party plaintiff in this lawsuit by

Order of the Third District Court, Judge J. Dennis Frederick, dated July
20, 1987. (R. 587-588)
9.

Intervener's Complaint was filed in Third District Court

on July 29, 1987.
10.

(R. 583-585)

Defendant's Answer

filed August

17, 1987

raised

the

defense of the statute of limitations. (R. 594-596)
11.
21,

1987

Intervener filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August

(R. 601-603) asserting as the basis for such motion, that

Defendant was collaterally estopped from denying the facts found by Judge
Croft.
12.

Defendant thereafter filed a Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment on September 4, 1987 (R. 614-615) asserting as the basis for such
cross motion, the statute of limitations.
13.

The motions were heard by the Honorable J.

Dennis

Frederick on September 14, 1987, and on September 24, 1987 Judge Frederick
signed an order denying Intervener's motion and granting Defendant's cross
motion, and judgment was entered dismissing the catplaint filed by the
Intervener.

(R. 620-621)

It is this Order and Judgment Dismissing

Complaint in Intervention which is the subject of Intervener's appeal.
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SDMMAKY OF ARGDMENTS

1.

The claims asserted against Defendant in the Intervener's

Corplaint are barred by the statute of limitations because more than four
years have elapsed between the time the heirs of Etta Wood knew of the
alleged wrongful acts of her brother, Milton J. Hiltsley, and of the
repudiation of any intention of the Defendant to hold the moneys in trust
for the Etta Wood estate.
2.
LLC.A.

The statute of limitations is not tolled by Title 78-12-40,

1953, as amended, because Intervener was not a party to the first

action filed by Plaintiff, was not and is not Plaintiff's representative,
did not seek any relief in the first action, and bears no conmunity of
interest or privity of estate with the Plaintiff.

Intervener's claims are

new and substantively different than those asserted by Plaintiff in the
first action.
3.

As part of Intervener's appeal, he seeks to have this Court

reverse the order denying his motion for summary judgment and to grant the
same.

Such an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an

appealable order.

ARGUMENT

Point 1. INIERVENOR'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT ARE BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMnATIONS.
The claim asserted against the Defendant by the Intervener in his
Corrplaint in Intervention is that Defendant holds property which belongs to
Intervener

as

personal

representative

5

of

the

estate

of

Etta

Wood

(paragraphs 7 and 8 of Oamplaint, R. 592) and that such property is held by
Defendant as a trustee for Etta Wood's estate (paragraph (3) of prayer for
relief in Complaint. (R. 593)
Although the Complaint never uses the words "constructive trust", it
is clear that such is the principle of law on which Intervenor seeks to
hold Defendant as a trustee for the Wood estate. (Appellant's Brief, Point
II, p. 15-19)
The statute of limitations applicable to a constructive trust is
Title 75-12-25, which is four years, and which begins to run from the time
the beneficiary has notice of the trustee's repudiation of the trust.
Wasden v. Coltharp, 631 P. 2d 849 (Utah 1981); Walker v. Walker, 17 Ut. 2d
53, 404 P. 2d 253 (1965).
Assuming that a constructive trust existed, as the lower court must
have assumed for purposes of the Defendants cross motion for summary
judgment, the evidence is unclear as to when, exactly, the heirs of Etta
Wood first knew that the Reverend Hiltsley had repudiated his trust and had
deposited the monies he allegedly held for the benefit of Etta Wood, or her
estate,

into

savings

accounts

or

certificates

in his

name

and the

Defendant's, as joint tenants. It is clear, however, that the heirs became
aware of such a possibility at the time of the lcwer court's decision,
entered by Judge Croft, on the 29th day of March, 1983, awarding the estate
of Etta Wood in excess of $40,000.00 based upon the court's finding that a
constructive trust existed.
Under the most favorable set of facts which Intervenor could argue,
he knew (which means the heirs knew) at the time of his appointment as
personal representative, on May 25, 1983, of the alleged facts giving rise
to his present lawsuit and of the alleged wrong of Milton J. Hiltsley in
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depositing monies received

from Etta Wood

certificates of deposit in question.

in the bank accounts and

In addition, by May 25, 1983, Etta

Wood's heirs were aware of Defendant's claim to such monies and of her
repudiation of any alleged obligation she mic£it have to hold such monies in
trust for the estate of Etta Wood, because Defendant had filed her Notice
of Appeal on April 11, 1983. (R. 100-101)
From May 25, 1983 until Intervener filed his complaint in the Third
District Court on July 29, 1987, a period of more than 4 years had elapsed.
Intervener has not denied, in either his Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the lewer court (R. 616-618) or in his Brief before
this Court, that the heirs were aware of the alleged facts which are the
basis of Intervener's coitplaint by May 25, 1983. Intervener's position is
that he is not barred by the statute of limitations because of the
provisions of Title 78-12-40, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.

Point 2. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT TOLLED BY TTTTE 78-12-40.
Title 78-12-40, U.C.A. 1953, as amended provides as follows:
Effect of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either
by law or contract for exxnmencing the same shall have
expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
The facts of Intervener's case fail to meet the test of Title 78-1240 in several respects:
(1) The statute clearly says "the plaintiff, or if he dies... his
representatives".

The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thomas v.

Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956) interpreted the meaning

7

of the word "plaintiff" in the statute to include "any party to the
original lawsuit who had affirmatively sought relief therein".

Intervener

was not a party plaintiff or defendant in the original lawsuit tried before
Judge Croft. He certainly was not Plaintiff's representative.
(2) Intervenor sought no relief in the original lawsuit.

Intervenor

asks this Court, on page 10 of his Brief, to extend the meaning of the word
"plaintiff" in Title 78-12-40 to include not only a party who seeks
affirmative relief "in this and the prior action", but to any party who
affirmatively seeks relief in this or in the prior action".

(emphasis

added)
He also asks this Court to equate the seeking of relief in the prior
action to Intervener's seeking "the relief granted her by Judge Croft prior
to

the time

the statute of limitations had run."

(See p.

10 of

Intervener's Brief)
Such an extension of the statutory language would be entirely at
odds with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the Thomas, supra, case
and in IXinn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983) discussed below.
(3)

Intervenor bears no identity with, or legal relationship to,

the Plaintiff.

Each represents wholly different parties vfaose claims are

substantively different and inccirpatible. Whereas Plaintiff made claims in
her suit against Defendant of

fraud, undue

influence, alienation of

affections, and diversion of the subject savings accounts and certificates
in which Plaintiff claimed an interest in her own right, (Decision of S.
Ct., R. 583), Intervenor claims that Milton J. Hiltsley, whose estate is a
plaintiff (and third party defendant herein) had a fiduciary relationship
with his sister, Etta Wood, which was breached, and that Milton J. Hiltsley
and/or Defendant held such savings accounts and certificates as trustees
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for the benefit of Etta Wood's estate. (Conplaint in Intervention, R. 589593)
Decisions throughout the country seem to agree that a person who
claims an independent cause of action cannot intervene in the original
action after the statute of limitations has run. 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation
of Actions, § 263; 8 AIR 2d p. 92, § 43. Or, said in another way, "...where
no asmmunity of interest or privity of estate exists between the intervenor
and another party or parties to the original action, the connraencernent of
the action before the statute of limitations has run does not inure to the
benefit of a person who intervenes after the time when an action would be
barred." 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 262. See also 8 ALR 2d p.
90, § 42.
The saving provisions of Title 78-12-40 are of no help to Intervener
either.

As stated in 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitations of Actions, § 318, at page

820:
As a general rule a statute permitting
commencement of a new action within a specified time
after failure of a prior action other than on the
merits is not applicable where the parties in the new
action are not the same as the ones in the prior
action.
Thus, where an enabling act permits a
subsequent action after the limitation period where
the first suit has failed, the second suit must be
substantially the same cause of action and must be
prosecuted by the same plaintiff or his legal
representatives against all the defendants vrtio were
necessary parties to the first suit or their legal
representatives. And a saving statute does not apply
when the new action is brought against a different
defendant than was the first one, or by a different
plaintiff.
In the case of Dunn v. Kellv. 675 P. 2d 571 (Utah 1983) the first
plaintiff in a wrongful death action was the guardian-ad-litem for a minor
who claimed to be the natural son of the decedent.

His action was

dismissed when it was established that the said minor was not the child of
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the decedent and not, therefore, entitled to recover under the action. The
second coirplaint, filed by the statutory heirs of the decedent, was filed
after the statute of limitations for actions in wrongful death had run.
The trial court dismissed the second coirplaint on the grounds that the
Statute of Limitation had run, and the decision was appealed.

In it's

opinion affirming the dismissal by the trial court on the basis of the
statute of limitations, Justice Durham, writing for a unanimous court, in
reference to Title 78-12-40, stated the following:
There is no basis in the statute for the construction
the appellants urge upon us. The statute clearly says "the
plaintiff or if he dies... his representatives." in Thomas v
Braffet's Heirs. 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956), this
Court construed the term "plaintiff" to include any party to
the original lawsuit who had affirmatively sought relief
therein, thus giving a deferriant-cxxmterclaimant the benefit
of its provisions. The Court said:
We think, however, that the purpose behind the
statute is plain and that the legislature intended
that anyone who had a cause in litigation which
was dismissed for some reason "otherwise than upon
the merits" should have a reasonable time, which it
set as one year, to reassert and attempt to
establish his rights in court.... We think that
the word "plaintiff" as used in this section was
meant to include not only the party who brings the
action, but any party \<dio affirmatively seeks
relief .. .in this and the prior action.
Id. at 62, 305 P. 2d at
(emphasis added).

510-11

(citations omitted)

The appellants concede they sought no relief and in fact
were not parties to the prior action. They also concede they
have no legal relationship to the original plaintiff,....
Absent any identity or legal relationship between these
appellants and the plaintiff in the first suit, it is
impossible for this Court to apply § 78-12-40 to them. They
simply had no interest in the first suit and are now barred
from litigating their interest in this case because it is not
timely asserted.
As in the case now before the Court, the second plaintiffs in the
Dunn v. Kelly, supra, case represented that they had attempted to intervene
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prior to the running of the statute of limitations. The court, in response
to such assertion, stated:
These representations are not matters of record in this case
and, even if true, merely establish that the appellants had an
opportunity to assert their claim in a timely fashion, but lost it
through their failure to appeal from the denial of their motion to
amend. We can do nothing to rectify that loss in this case without
ignoring the clear language and intent of our statute. (Emphasis
added)
None of the cases cited by Intervener in his Brief, Point 1, is
factually similar to the case before this Court, except the case of IXmn v.
Kelly, supra.

Intervenor claims that the Dunn case is distinguishable from

the case at hand but he offers nothing to support his conclusion.
Defendant asserts that the case of IXinn v.
determinative of the issue before this Court.

Kelly, supra, is

The only difference in the

two cases is that in this case, the second plaintiff (Etta Wood estate) had
been erroneously awarded judgment in the original action.
The court in Houser v. Smith. 19 Ut. 150, 56 P. 683 (1889) declared
that type of judgment to be
"absolutely void".

"wrongfully and

illegally decreed" and

The court in Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 99 Ut. 158,

103 P. 2d 134 (1940) declared that type of judgment to be a decree which
could not alter the rights and duties of the non party or "bind it in any
way whatever".

And the court in R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881

(Utah 1978) said that such a judgment in favor of a non party could not be
rendered.
If the judgment granted by Judge Croft in the first action was
absolutely void, wrongful and illegal, and did not alter the rights or
duties of the Estate of Etta Wood, as the cases and authorities hold, then
the "right" to maintain this action should not be expanded or protected to
defeat the statute of limitations.
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Intervenor could have filed his lawsuit in a separate action against
Defendant within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, and that
action could have been stayed pending the decision of the Supreme Court in
the earlier action.

Instead Intervenor gambled that the decision of the

Supreme Court would be favorable, and lost.

Point 3. THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF INTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A FINAL ORDER FROM WHICH AN APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN.

Intervener's motion for summary judgment (R601-603) was denied by
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick in his order dated September 24, 1987 (R620-621).
Without arguing the merits of such denial, it is clear that the
procedural law in Utah does not permit an appeal from the denial of a
motion for summary judgment, such an order not being a final order or
judgment.

Dennison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P 2d 1359, 1360 (Utah

1977); Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 3 (a).
For the above reason, Defendant does not respond further to Points
II and III set out in Intervener's Brief.

CX3NCLUSI0N

The order and judgment of the lower court dismissing Intervener's
conplaint should be affirmed.
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Dated this 19th day of February, 1988.

RCMNEY & CONDIE

DeLyle H.Ttondie
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that true copies of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief were served upon Intervener by hand delivering four (4) copies of the
same this 19th day of February, 1988, to his attorney, Dwight L. King,
Esq., Dwight L. King & Associates, P.C., Suite 205 Sentinel Bldg., 2121
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

DeLyle H. Coi
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